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17 January 1961 25X1

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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN



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nations. The general strike is an indication that Iraqi anti-Communist elements are becoming bolder in their protests.

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
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					armed forces in			
					se Minister Cast y junta before it			
			takeover. The	attempt	reportedly will enforce strong ru	be made	soon. The	or-
			military directo	rate in	order to bring t	the Comr	nunist threat	
			to be permitted	to cont	inue political ac	tivity in		
25X1			congressional e	lection	s which may be o	called in	May.	25X1
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			17 Jan 61		DAILY BRIEF		iii	
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### CONFIDENTIAL

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#### Sino-Pakistani Boundary Talks

drawn up by Peiping.

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Communist China and Pakistan are discussing a preliminary boundary agreement, according to the Pakistani foreign minister. The talks apparently follow a recent suggestion by the Chinese Communist ambassador to Pakistan that negotiations be started over the Hunza area and such other regions along the border as Pakistan might wish to discuss. Prior to that time Peiping had not shown any interest in such talks.

Peiping has apparently concluded that its failure to gain any concessions from India after the talks between Chou and Nehru in March 1960 and several months of low-level discussion by Foreign Ministry experts necessitated a change in tactics. The Chinese may hope that even a preliminary border agreement with Pakistan, following boundary accords with Burma and Nepal, will put addition pressure on New Delhi to accept a compromise solution for the Sino-Indian border along lines

The Chinese probably also feel that a bilateral boundary settlement with Pakistan would prejudice Indian claims in the Ladakh area. The Karakoram mountain range, which might provide the basis for demarcating portions of the Sino-Pakistani border, roughly divides the Indian- and Chinese-occupied parts of Ladakh.

Pakistan has been especially concerned about China's claims to the Pakistani border state of Hunza and apparently hopes to forestall any serious incidents while gaining Peiping's recognition of the "traditional" border. In addition, the Pakistanis probably calculate that China's interest in making a show of progress at this time gives them a transitory bargaining advantage.

A preliminary boundary agreement would likely follow the pattern of preliminary Chinese border accords with Nepal and Burma. In each case a joint committee was established to negotiate the formal demarcation, and ground rules were set up to govern the committee's action.

/Fearing that Prime Minister Qasim is about to favor Mosul's pro-Communist elements, anti-Communists there began a general strike on 13 January. This action follows a student strike begun in Mosul schools on 1 January after the arrest of several anti-Communist teachers. Rumors have spread in Mosul that Qasim intends to replace two strongly anti-Communist officials -- the governor and the police chief --who have tacitly condoned revenge killings of Communists during the past several months. These assassinations, which have averaged six or seven a week since early last fall, have been in retaliation for massacres by Communist elements in the aftermath of the March 1959 Mosul revolt. Although Iraqi military courts have been carrying out repressive measures against Iraqi Communists, Qasim has repeatedly vitiated the courts' work by releasing imprisoned Communists.

On 28 December the Baghdad military court handed down death sentences to seven Communists and gave 22 other Communists and pro-Communists prison sentences for their part in the Mosul massacres; 55 others were sentenced the day before. Meanwhile, the editor of the country's largest Communist paper failed to appear in court on 27 December to face charges of violating censorship regulations; he is believed to have gone underground.]

While apparently trying to mollify local Communists, Qasim appears to appreciate the strength of Iraqi "nationalist" sentiment in favor of Arab solidarity. Emphasis on Arabism has become an increasingly dominant theme in his recent speeches: he has frequently referred to the "Arab nation," talked of greater economic and political cooperation, and displayed a less hostile attitude toward the UAR. However, none of these gestures is likely to placate Iraqi anti-Communist and pan-Arab elements. Some plotting against Qasim appears to be continuing, although rivalries between factions have militated so far against efforts to overthrow him.

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	Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500140001-5 The Situation in the Congo	25X1
25X1 •	The initiative in the eastern Congo remains with the Lumumbist forces and their tribal allies, who reportedly are becoming more aggressive as a result of recent successes. Baluba tribesmen have cut the rail link between Elisabethville and Kamina air base and, together with troops from Kivu Province, continue to oppose reinforcement of the UN garrison at Manono.  the UN in the area does not plan to take strong action against the dissidents unless ordered to do so by headquarters in Leopoldville.  the Baluba forces will succeed in setting up an "independent" state in northern Katanga.	25X1 25X1
	Tshombé's government in Elisabethville reportedly now has imported more than 100 Belgian paracommandos. Although Tshombé apparently distrusts his native troops, Belgian officers with the Katanga forces discount the possibility of dissension among Africans in the armed forces. The native civilians in many of the province's important mining cities reportedly present a threat to order; they apparently have some weapons at their disposal.	
	UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has reiterated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative in Leopoldville, and has rejected Kasavubu's formal demand of 14 January that Dayal be recalled. Hammarskjold took issue with charges made against Dayal by Kasavubu, but said he would refer the matter to the Security Council for final action.	25X1
25X1	Dayal has been withholding information and slanting reports in such a way as to favor Lumumba supporters. However, Hammarskjold angrily told American officials on 14 January that he was "very determined" to keep Dayal in the Congo, despite a campaign of "Russian-type" innuendo which he implied was coming from Western sources. Nevertheless Hammarskjold may yet have to appoint a new representative if the UN follows	
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: : :	the precedent of acceding to such requests from recognized chiefs of state in the country where UN troops are serving.	25X1
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#### Salvadoran Armed Forces Reportedly Planning Coup

The armed forces of El Salvador, under the leadership of	
the minister of defense, Colonel Castillo Navarette, plan to	
overthrow the ruling civilian-military junta soon in an attempt	
	5X
The armed forces,	) <b>/</b>
which had been virtually paralyzed by disunity, appear to have	
been spurred to cooperation by increasingly bold Communist ac-	
tivity in recent weeks. Unrestricted Communist organizational	
the visit to Cuba earlier this month of a group of Salvadoran ex-	5X6
tremists have particularly heightened the concern of the military.	
cromises have particularly neightened the concern of the mintary.	
the army is well or-	
ganized for the coup, which has the support of "practically all"	
important military leaders. A newly formed political party plans	
public demonstrations in the capital during the next day or so to	
	· 🗸
give are army a brow or popular support for its action,	5X′
The army plan reportedly calls for strong rule initially through a three-man military junta composed of the defense minister, army chief of staff Colonel Portillo, and Colonel Yanez, one of the three military members on the present six-man junta. The new government would permit continued activity by all non-Communist political parties in preparation for congressional elections which may be called next May. The Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party would be outlawed.	
The coup planners are said to recognize the possibility of some bloodshed after they initiate action, and the Communist-influenced student and labor groups in the capital would probably attempt counteraction. As long as the army remains united, however, it could probably control any disorders.	5X <sup>-</sup>

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